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Abstract—Online social media platforms have made the world
more connected than ever before, thereby making it easier for
everyone to spread their content across a wide variety of audi-
ences. Twitter is one such popular platform where people publish
tweets to spread their messages to everyone. Twitter allows users
to Retweet other users’ tweets in order to broadcast it to their
network. The more retweets a particular tweet gets, the faster
it spreads. This creates incentives for people to obtain artificial
growth in the reach of their tweets by using certain blackmarket
services to gain inorganic appraisals for their content.
In this paper, we attempt to detect such tweets that have been
posted on these blackmarket services in order to gain artificially
boosted retweets. We use a multitask learning framework to
leverage soft parameter sharing between a classification and a
regression based task on separate inputs. This allows us to effec-
tively detect tweets that have been posted to these blackmarket
services, achieving an F1-score of 0.89 when classifying tweets as
blackmarket or genuine.
Index Terms—Blackmarket, Collusion, Twitter, Online Social
Networks, Multitask Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter is an important medium for people and companies to
promote their products, ideologies, or to reach out and connect
with other people in the form of micro-conversations. Twitter
provides users with multiple ways of showing their support
towards a tweet in the form of Likes, Retweets and Quotes.
These content-level appraisals help in spreading the content
further and act as a measure of users’ agreement on the value
of the content. The count of these content-level appraisals
therefore determines the influence of a particular tweet and its
author. This has led to the creation of certain blackmarket ser-
vices such as FreeFollowers (https://www.freefollowers.io/),
Like4Like (https://like4like.org/), YouLikeHits (https://www.
youlikehits.com/), JustRetweet (http://justretweet.com), which
allow users to post their tweets in order to gain inorganic
appraisals in the form of Likes, Retweets and Quotes [1], [2].
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE OF A COLLUSIVE AND A GENUINE TWEET.
Blackmarket Tweet
Appingine offers your custom app development in
amazing price.
This EASTER gives life to your idea.
Call: 800-xxx-xxxx
visit: https://**shortlink**
#Easter Weekend #iosdev # AndroidDev #gamedev
#webdev #appdev #Easter https://**shortlink**
Genuine Tweet
Google vows to double podcast audience with new
Android app **shortlink** via @usatoday
There has been a lot of research on the detection of
fraudulent activities on Twitter such as detection of bots [3],
fake followers [4], collusive retweeters [1], [2], and social
spam [5]. However, the problem of detecting tweets that are
posted to these blackmarket services has not been tackled
before. The tweets submitted to blackmarket services are not
necessarily spam or promotional tweets. As we observe in
our data, there is some intersection between spammers and
blackmarket users since spammers may also try to gain more
appraisals by using these services. However, existing spam
tweet detection approaches do not work that well in identifying
individual tweets as blackmarket tweets (as shown in Table II).
Table I shows a sample tweet that was posted on a black-
market service and another sample tweet that was not. In this
paper, we make the first attempt to detect tweets that are posted
on blackmarket services. Our aim is to build a system that can
flag tweets soon after they are posted, which is why we do
not consider temporal features such as the number of retweets
or likes that a tweet keeps gaining over time. Instead, we only
rely on the features and representations extracted from the
content of the tweets.
We curate a novel dataset of tweets that have been posted to
blackmarket services, and a corresponding set of tweets that
haven’t. We propose a multitask learning approach to combine
properties from the characterization of blackmarket tweets
via traditional feature extraction, with a deep learning based
feature representation of the tweets. We train a neural network
which takes as input both the traditional feature representation
This paper has been accepted at IEEE/ACM International Conference on
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as well as the deep learning based representation generated
using the Tweet2Vec model [6], and utilizes cross-stitch units
[7] to learn an optimal combination of shared and task-specific
knowledge via soft parameter sharing.
We show that our multitask learning approach outperforms
Twitter spam detection approaches, as well as state-of-the-
art classifiers by 14.1% (in terms of F1-score), achieving an
F1-score of 0.89 on our dataset. In short, the contributions
of the paper are threefold: a new dataset, characterization of
blackmarket tweets, and a novel multitask learning framework
to detect tweets posted on blackmarket services.
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies have focused on detecting malicious activi-
ties such as spam, fake content and blackmarket services. Here,
we mention some of these studies which we deem as pertinent
to our work. We also mention the prior usage of multitask
learning in a similar context.
Spam/Fake Tweet Detection: The problem of fake and
spam tweets is not new. Many solutions have been proposed
to tackle this problem. Yardi et al. [8] showed that the network
structure of spammers and non-spammers is different, and also
tracked the life cycle of endogenous Twitter content. Chen
et al. [9] conducted a comprehensive evaluation of several
machine learning algorithms for timely detection of spam.
Fake tweets, on the other hand, are the tweets which spread
misinformation. Serrano et al. [10] provided an extensive sur-
vey on fake tweet detection. Unlike spam tweets, fake tweets
are mostly associated with major events, and the accounts that
produce these fake contents are mostly created during these
events [11], [12].
Blackmarket Services: Blackmarket services have recently
received considerable attention due to the increase in the
number of users using them. Analysis of such underground
services was first documented in [13] where the authors
examined the properties of social networks formed for black-
market services. Liu et al. [14] proposed DetectVC which
incorporates graph structure and the prior knowledge from the
collusive followers to solve a voluntary following problem.
Motoyama et al. [13] provided a detailed analysis of six
underground forms, examining the properties of those social
network structures that are formed and services that are being
exchanged. Dutta et al. [1] investigated the customers involved
in gaining fake retweets. Chetan et al. [2] proposed CoReRank,
an unsupervised model and CoReRank+, a semi-supervised
model which extends CoReRank to detect collusive users
involved in retweeting activities.
Multitask Learning: Multitask learning is used whenever
we have two or more similar tasks to optimise together.
Most of the related studies on multitask learning are based
on how the tasks can be better learned together. Zhang et
al. [15] classified multitask learning models into five types
and reported the characteristics of each approach. Cross-Stitch
units were introduced by Misra et al. [7], which can learn an
optimal combination of shared and task-specific representa-
tions. Gupta et al. [16] proposed GIRNet, a unified position-
sensitive multitask recurrent neural network architecture.
III. DATASET
A. Blackmarket Services
As studied in [1], there are two prevalent models of black-
market services, namely premium and freemium. Premium
services are only available upon payment from customers,
whereas freemium services offer both paid and unpaid options.
The unpaid services are available to the users when they
contribute to the blackmarket by providing appraisals for other
users’ content. Here, we mainly concentrate on freemium
services. The freemium services can be further divided into
three categories: (i) social-share services (request customers
to spread the content on social media), (ii) credit-based
services (customers earn credits by providing appraisals, and
can then use the credits earned to gain appraisals for their
content), and (iii) auto-time retweet services (customers
need to provide their Twitter access tokens, upon which their
content is retweeted 10-20 times for each 15-minute window).
B. Data Collection
We collected data from Credit-based Freemium services
because their service model is easy to understand. We crawled
two blackmarket sites – YouLikeHits and Like4Like, between
the period of February and April 2019. We created dummy
accounts (after careful IRB approval) on these sites to par-
ticipate in the platform and recorded Tweet IDs of the tweets
that were posted for gaining retweets. We used Twitter’s REST
API to collect the tweet objects of these tweets. The timelines
of the authors of these tweets were also collected, allowing us
to find genuine tweets by the same users that have not been
posted to these blackmarket sites.
C. Dataset Description
In total, we collected 2, 690 tweets posted on blackmarket
sites. Out of these, we removed non-English tweets and tweets
with a length of less than two characters. Finally, we were
left with 1, 796 blackmarket tweets. Then, from the timelines
of the authors of these tweets, we randomly sampled 2, 000
genuine tweets that were not posted on these blackmarket sites
during the same period. Both the blackmarket and genuine
tweets were also inspected manually.
D. Analysis of Blackmarket Tweets
To further understand the purpose of the collusive users
behind the usage of blackmarket services, we annotated black-
market tweets in our test set into a few discrete categories.
The statistics of the categories are as follows: Promotional
- 43.75%, Entertainment - 15.89%, Spam - 13.57%, News -
7.86%, Politics - 4.82%, and Others - 14.11%. We considered
a tweet as Promotional only if the tweet attempts to promote
a website/product. Most of the tweets in the Others category
include personal tweets without any call to action or promo-
tion, but this also can be considered as self-promotion. We
further noticed that there were about 5% of normal tweets
on concerning issues such as “pray for ...”, indicating that
blackmarket services are also being used for non-business
purposes. 99% of tweets other than the tweets from Others
class included at least one URL, and 100% of the URLs in
the blackmarket tweets were shortened.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
This section describes the features and tweet representation
methodology, and the proposed model to solve the problem.
A. Tweet Content Features
We use the following features based on the tweet content:
• TF1: Number of user mentions in the tweet
• TF2: Number of hashtags in the tweet
• TF3: Number of URLs in the tweet
• TF4: Count of media content in the tweet
• TF5: Is the tweet a reply to another tweet?
• TF6: Number of special characters (non alpha-numeric)
in the tweet
• TF7: Length of the content (number of characters) in the
tweet
• TF8: Sentiment score of the tweet obtained using Senti-
WordNet, ranging from -1 (negative) to +1 (positive)
• TF9: Number of noun words in the tweet
• TF10: Number of adjective words in the tweet
• TF11: Number of pronoun words in the tweet
• TF12: Number of verbs in the tweet
B. Tweet Content Representation
We use the Tweet2Vec model [6] to generate a vector-
space representation of each of the tweets. Tweet2Vec is a
character-level deep learning based encoder for social media
posts trained on the task of predicting the associated hashtags.
It considers the assumption that posts with the same hashtags
should have similar representation. It uses a bi-directional
Gated Recurrent Unit (Bi-GRU) for learning the tweet rep-
resentation. To get the representation for a particular tweet,
the model combines the final GRU states by going through a
forward and backward pass over the entire sequence.
We use the pre-trained model provided by Dhingra et al.
[6], which is trained on a dataset of 2 million tweets, to
get the tweet representation. This gives us a 500-dimensional
representation of each tweet, based on its content.
C. Proposed Model
The architecture of our model is shown in Figure 1. We
adopt multitask learning to develop our model. The primary
task is set as a binary classification problem, wherein the
tweets are classified as blackmarket or genuine. The secondary
task is set as a regression problem, wherein the number of
likes and retweets that a tweet will gain after five days of
being posted is predicted.
Fig. 1. Architecture of our proposed multitask learning model for the detection
of blackmarket tweets.
1) Model Inputs: The model takes a different input feature
vector for each of the tasks.
Primary Input: The primary task takes as input the tweet
content representation generated by the Tweet2Vec model,
which is a 500-dimensional vector for each of the tweets, as
described above.
Secondary Input: The secondary task takes as input the
vector of tweet content features, which is a 12-dimensional
vector, as described above.
2) Neural Network: As shown in Figure 1, the inputs are
fed into separate fully connected (FC) layers with cross-stitch
units stacked between successive layers. The cross-stitch units
find the best shared representations using linear combinations,
and learn the optimal linear combinations for a given set of
tasks. The cross-stitch units essentially allow us to unify two
separate networks for two separate tasks into a single network
wherein each layer of the network shares the parameters from
the other network using linear combinations. The network also
employs batch-normalization and dropout to avoid overfitting.
3) Model Output: The output layer of the first task classifies
tweets as blackmarket or genuine using a cross entropy loss
function. The output layer of the second task predicts the
numerical values for the number of retweets and likes that
a tweet will gain after five days of being posted by using a
Mean Squared Error (MSE) loss. Note that the performance
of the secondary task is not of importance to us, however, the
secondary task helps the primary task. Therefore, we focus
on the performance of the model in the primary task during
training and evaluation.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Baseline Methods
Since there is no prior work on blackmarket tweet detection,
we chose state-of-the-art Twitter spam detection methods as
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPETING METHODS.
Method Precision Recall F1-Score
Multitask Learning 0.89 0.89 0.89
Feature Concat. - RF 0.69 0.68 0.68
Feature Concat. - MLP 0.75 0.75 0.75
Feature Concat. - SVM 0.78 0.78 0.78
Spam Detection 1 0.76 0.76 0.76
Spam Detection 2 0.80 0.78 0.77
baselines, along with training some state-of-the-art classifiers
on the features we generated for our dataset.
1) Twitter Spam Detection:
Spam Detection 1: We use the Twitter spam detection method
proposed by Wu et al. [5]. It uses the Word2Vec and Doc2Vec
models to encode the tweets into a vector representation, which
is fed to a MLP classifier in order to classify the tweets as
spam or not-spam. We use the same methodology to classify
tweets in our dataset as blackmarket or genuine.
Spam Detection 2: For baseline 2, we consider the approach
proposed by Rajdev et. al. [12]. They proposed flat and
hierarchical classifications approaches with few of the standard
set of features which can classify spam, fake and legitimate
tweets. We use their experimental setup with Random Forest
classifier on our dataset.
2) Feature Concatenation: We generate a combined feature
vector by concatenating the tweet content features and the
encoding generated by Tweet2Vec. This feature vector is then
fed to state-of-the-art machine learning classifiers - Random
Forest (RF), Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP), and Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM).
B. Evaluation Setup
We consider the problem as a binary classification problem,
where the tweets are classified into two classes - blackmarket
and genuine. The performance of each competing method is
measured using the following metrics: Precision, Recall, and
F1-score. The primary output of the multitask learning model
gives us the classification result, which is what we use to
evaluate our model. All hyperparameters of the models are
appropriately tuned. The average results are reported after 5-
fold cross-validation.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As shown in Table II, we observe that the multitask learning
based model which uses the Tweet2Vec encoding and the
content features as inputs to two separate tasks outperforms all
the baselines, achieving an F1-score of 0.89 for classification
of tweets as Blackmarket or Genuine. The best baseline is
Spam Detector 2 which achieves an F1-score of 0.77.
We analyse the false negatives generated by our model to
find which type of tweets the model finds difficult to classify.
The percentage of each class in the false negatives is as fol-
lows: Promotional - 23.29%, Politics - 10.96%, Entertainment
- 21.92%, News - 9.59%, Spam - 5.48%, and Others - 28.77%.
We observe that the tweets belonging to the category Others
are difficult to classify since they are similar to genuine tweets
in terms of content. The results also indicate that our model is
robust while classifying blackmarket tweets belonging to the
following categories – News, Spam and Politics.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel multitask learning
approach to solve the problem of identification of tweets that
are submitted to blackmarket services, without the use of any
temporal features. To sum up, our contributions are three-fold:
(i) Characterization: We proposed 12 tweet content based
features that are useful in the task of identifying blackmarket
tweets, (ii) Classification: We developed a novel Multitask
Learning based model to classify tweets as blackmarket tweets
or genuine tweets, (iii) Dataset: We collected a dataset consist-
ing of tweets that have been submitted to blackmarket services
in order to gain inorganic appraisals.
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